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Hanna Dębska Kraków/ Poland
 
 
The Apparent Dilemma - Dangerous Consequences? 
Between the Legal and Ethical Standards. 
 
Abstract: Democratic rule of law has been struggling with the occurring problem of pluralism of 
values. It is therefore still faced with the dilemma of ordering the relationship of law and ethics, 
namely with the question whether in the issue of legal solutions the priority is granted to ethics or to 
law. In the case of dominance of the positivist paradigm, it is all the more important because the 
ethical issue is marginalized in it. It turns out that the same authority, deciding on similar issues, at 
the junction of two areas: ethics and law, can make mutually contradictory decisions: once giving 
priority to ethics, whereas - at different times - to positive law. On a closer analysis, this contradiction 
proves illusory because under the guise of protection of a positive paradigm, the hidden fact is that the 
axiological decision underlies the resolution concerning law. This decision protects the values that 
have priority in the scale of preferential value of decision-making body. The example considered in the 
article  concerns  the  interface  between  ethical  and  legal  norms  against  selected  rulings  of  the 
Constitutional Court. The doubts that arise in this context may be in future avoided or perhaps, if 
necessary, resolved by adopting a two-aspect model of legal norm. This model in its vertical approach 
has an evaluative element. This allows to deem the seemingly contradictory decision in similar cases 
as justified one. It also shows that in practice the rightness of the resolution takes precedence both 
over ethics as well as over law. 
Keywords:  axiology;  Constitutional  Court;  ethic;  ethical  standards;  legal  norm;  legal  standards; 
positivist paradigm; two-aspect model of legal norm. 
 
I. Introduction 
The legal system is just one of many normative systems operating within broadly understood 
culture. Although the coordination of legal norms with the norms of other normative systems 
does not constitute a sine qua non condition of formal introduction of the former norms in the 
social  structures,  without  a  doubt  it  has  a  fundamental  impact  on  their  functioning 
(particularly  in  matters  of  compliance).  Existing  law,  even  if  only  formally  valid,  is  not 
created in a “social vacuum”, but it is the result, at least in part, of the same influences that 
affect  other  normative  systems.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  need  to  seek  consensus  and 
cohesion among them is in the interest of the law, though achieving completely satisfactory 
results  in  this  matter  seems  –  least  to  say  –  difficult  and  sometimes  even  impossible. 
                                                           
 Ph.D student of law, Chair of Sociology of Law, Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University, 
Poland. 2 
Furthermore, the pluralistic society of liberal democracy faces legal policy and the legislator 
with even higher demands due to the contrary tendencies that occur within it. On the one 
hand, there is a significant expansion of the boundaries of the social agency of individuals, 
which  is  manifested  by  a  widespread  emphasis  on:  relativism,  especially  in  matters  of 
morality,  individuality  and  the  activation  of  individuals.  All  these  factors  taken  together 
contribute to the occurrence of “axiological antagonisms”. The democratic state indeed does 
not preclude even a simultaneous existence of mutually polarising ethical systems as long as 
they do not violate the core of democracy. The latter is understood as to maintain democracy, 
namely a certain degree of order, guaranteed by law.
1 On the other hand, in a world where 
there are still unpredictable changes that generate new forms of risk,
2 there is the need to trust 
the experts
3 and the increasing trend of globalization and international integration processes, 
necessitate the need to maintain the widest possible degree of coherence. 
This paper focuses on the relationship between law and morality, or to put it more 
precisely, the relation of legal norms to ethical norm s, which I treat as normative morality.
4 
This article aims to draw attention to the presence of axiological problems in decision making 
processes of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.
5 Thus, it is used as an excuse to ask 
questions about the future of the philosophy of law. The question which may accordingly be 
asked is whether in the event of taking legal decisions, there is the need (meaning: it is 
desirable, postulated or simply useful) to establish an unconditional priority between different 
normative systems, in particular between the ethical and legal ones? Whether the body that 
undertakes a resolution at the interface between these two normative systems should clearly 
identify this issue, and what consequences its argumentation could lead to.  
 
II. Between law and ethics - general considerations in the theory of law  
The issue of the relationship between the legal and ethical norms constitutes one of the most 
exploited problem in the theory and philosophy of law. It has been reflected in seemingly the 
oldest dispute between the conceptions of natural law and legal positivism, in other words, 
between axiological and anti-axiological trend. The first position emphasizes the relationship 
                                                           
1 Joanna Byrska, Pochodzenie treści etycznych w życiu publicznym, in: Etyka i polityka, ed. D. Probudzka, 2005, 
228. 
2 Urlich Beck, Risk society: Towards a New Modernity, 1992. 
3  Anthony  Giddens,  Living  in  a  Post-Traditional  Society,  in:  Beck  U.,  Giddens  A.,  Lash  S.,  Reflexive 
Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, 1994, 56-109. 
4 It is much easier to analyse the ethical norms – understood in such way – in relation to legal norms. They cease 
to exist in the minds of the entities that experience them, and thus they become conventional creations resulting 
from the belief of a given community (they are based on the commonly accepted axiological orientation) that 
arranges them in a set of moral norms. See Arno Anzenbacher, Wprowadzenie do filozofii, 2005, 337. A typical 
example of a detailed ethics are the norms contained in the code of professional ethics. 
5 In the Polish language also referred to as Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Trybunał, TK) 3 
between  law  and  morality,  thus  emphasizing  the  importance  of  axiological  issues  in  the 
researches on law (in the process of definition, interpreting and justifying law). The second 
trend, represented mainly by the continental positivism and normativism, not only opposes the 
fact of defining law by means of extra-legal categories, but by offering a consistent separation 
of the two systems of norms – it denies the importance of moral issues. The problem of the 
relationship between law and morality has been and is being discussed in all the legal theories 
(even in a seemingly neutral, analytic philosophy of law). Initially conflicting positions have 
been  modified  over  the  years  so  that  one  can  risk  a  statement  that  “soft”  versions  of 
positivism and new conceptions of natural law are no longer antagonistic, and they have 
“overlapping points”. Despite the latter, there has yet been no satisfactory solution concerning 
the relationship between legal and moral norms. 
The extensive literature both on the interconnection between law and morality/ethics/ has 
been limited in this paper to the most important issues. 
What is undoubtedly most beneficial in the relations between law and ethics is mutual 
interaction of these normative systems, namely a similar regulation of the same behaviour of 
the addressee of these norms. Such a situation allows to achieve a greater degree of social 
order. A contrario, the situation of the independence of these systems can lead to conflicts, 
tensions and antagonizing the public. It should be also added that it very often happens that 
the content of legal norms coincides extensionally with other normative systems of a given 
society, cooperating with them all, though not always in compliance with all of them (such an 
approach has been already well established for several years.
6 When drawing the boundaries 
between them, it is crucial to clearly specify under what criteria the relationship between law 
and morality is determined. These divisions can concentrate on the following basis: (a) the 
genesis,  (b)  the content,  (c) the formulation  of norms,  (d)  the c onditions,  manner and 
character of validity, (f) the penalties.
7 The theory of law analyses several types of relations 
that determine the interconnection between law and morality: (a) subjective, (b) validating, (c) 
functional, which can form five configurations.
8    
These relations imply the corresponding philosophical standpoints in the discourse on the 
interconnections between law and morality, classically revolving around the discourse on 
paternalism, moralism and moral neutrality of the law. These theor ies seek to answer the 
following questions: to what extent can law encroach on the realm of moral autonomy of 
                                                           
6  Wiesław Lang, Jerzy Wróblewski, Sylwester Zawadzki, Teoria państwa i prawa, 1986, 15. 
7 Maria Ossowska, Norma moralna a norma prawna, in:  Elementy socjologii prawa- wybór tekstów, vol. 1., ed. 
A. Kojder, E. Łojko, W. Staśkiewicz, A. Turska,  1990, 112-117. See also Krzysztof Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo. 
Zarys wykładu. Prawo w porządku społeczny, 2003, 97. 
8 Lech Morawski, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, 2002, 44-52; Lang, Wróblewski, Zawadzki (note 7), 301-312. 4 
individuals? To what extent moral beliefs can be, and should be imposed on those who do not 
share them.
9 What seems to gain utmost importance nowa days, even in the legal discourse, 
there are the conceptions of ethical pluralism (pluralism of values) which, according to 
Polanowska- Sygulska, assume that: there are many objective values that are knowable and 
disproportionate (namely, they are irreduci ble and they cannot be subject to hierarchical 
ordering, thus there is no possibility to resolute conflicts between them).
10 
 
III. Law and ethics in the judicial practice of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The resolutions at the interface between ethics and law, are reflected in the sphere of practical 
problems faced by the Constitutional Tribunal. It is erroneous to believe that the resolution at 
the interface between these two fields is an issue likely to find simple/obvious solutions, in a 
democratic state of law, which is still dominated by the positivist paradigm, or in which as if 
were in a principle, “a democratic way of law-making guarantees the realization of socially 
acceptable system of values as a source of morally legitimate legal norms, while preserving 
validating independence of law and morality”.
11 This situation is partly due to the wording of 
article 188 of the Constitution, which defines the scope of cognition of the Court and brings 
down its activities to “a verification of the conformity of statutes with the Constitution”. The 
content of this article is not only unclear for me, but most of all, insufficient, because it does 
not provide the justification/the rationale of the basis on which this “activity” could occur. In 
my opinion, this verification does not refer in all cases to the comparison understood as the 
analysis of the content of the legal norms contained in the provisions of statutes or other 
legislation and relevant norms contained in the provisions of the Constitution. In many cases, 
this  comparison  is  made  on  another,  apparently  extra-legal,  level  of  values.  Thus,  in  my 
opinion, the Constitutional Tribunal is often forced, in addition to the exegesis of the content 
of the legal norm, to assess in its analyses the degree of coherence, which occurs between the 
value that is protected by a given legal norm, and the value protected by the constitutional 
norm (it is the very ground that the Tribunal undertakes comparisons between them). Under 
this assumption, it cannot be the case that the legal norm would safeguard the values that 
would  not  be  constitutional  values  (or  worse,  they  would  be  in  contrast  to  constitutional 
values.  Axiological  compliance,  or  perhaps  more  precisely:  the  lack  of  axiological 
antagonism,  which  I  postulate,  would  correspond  to  the  standpoint  expressed  by  B. 
Zdziennicki, according to whom, apart from the jurisprudence of concepts and interests, the 
                                                           
9 Tomasz Pietrzykowski, Etyczne problemy prawa. Zarys wykładu,2005, 83-134. 
10 Beata Polanowska–Sygulska, Pluralizm wartości i jego implikacje filozofii prawa, 2008. 
11 Kazimierz Działocha,  the dissenting opinion to the case U. 1/92. 5 
Tribunal  undertakes  “the  jurisprudence  of  values”  that  “departs  from  the  solid  statutory 
foundations”. I entirely agree with the author that “there is a great need to refer to values 
when assessing the constitutionality of the challenged solutions (...), it can be defined as the 
need to “positivize values”.
12 
This standpoint would indicate such a plane (although not capable of being precisely 
defined  and  perhaps  disapprovingly  received  by  the  positivist  lawyers)  on  which  the 
Tribunal’s activity would be nonetheless fully understood and justified. I am convinced that it 
is nothing that would contradict the common-sense understanding of the actions undertaken 
by  the  Constitutional  Tribunal.  The  novelty  of  this  idea,  or  rather  its  straightforward 
expression, shifts values from their extra-legal status to the status of remaining, “being” in the 
law.  The  value  –  as  I  believe  –  does  not  only  underlie  the  legal  norm,  does  not  merely 
legitimize it, but above all, it constitutes its intrinsic element (as presented by the two-aspect 
model of a legal norm). 
In its judicial activity, the Tribunal often has to deal with the need to resolve not only the 
issue of the content conformity of legal norms with the Constitution, but also between the 
priority  of  legal  and  ethical  norms  introduced  into  the  legal  system.  The  latter  can  be 
illustrated on the example of analysing the codes of professional ethics norms that are granted 
statutory legitimization. This argumentation reveals that this is not a collision of legal and 
ethical norms that in fact constitutes the subject of the decision in these issues, but rather the 
conflict between the values protected by the legal and ethical norm. Thus the problem of 
determining  the  priority  is  not  reduced  to  establish  the  primacy  of  ethics  or  law,  but  to 
determine  in  each  case  the  value  which  the  Tribunal  considers  more  crucial  (worthy  of 
constitutional protection), is it the one contained in the legal norm or the one in the ethical 
norm. Accordingly, the Constitutional Tribunal more or less arbitrarily weighs values – it 
verifies the compliance with the Constitution of the value contained in the legal norm, with 
the one contained in the constitutional norm (leaving aside at this point the speculation about 
the basis on which such “balancing” of the values takes place). This thesis, as I believe, does 
not  contradict  a  commonly  adopted  requirement  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal  judges,  namely  the  fact  that  in  their  activities  they  are  subject  only  to  the 
Constitution. 
It can be assumed that in similar cases, at the interface of these two normativities, there 
can  be  issued  seemingly  mutually  contradictory  rulings,  once  giving  the  priority  to  legal 
norms (which granted the legitimization to enact deontological norms) and at different times –
                                                           
12 Bohdan Zdziennicki, Skuteczność prawa z perspektywy Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. in: Skuteczność prawa. X 
Konferencja Wydziałowa WPiA UW, 2009, 17-19. 6 
to ethical norms (issued on the basis of this authorization). It may also turn out that the ethical 
norms, incorporated into the law, will protect – not always rightly – crucial constitutional 
values and law, paradoxically, will have to play their role. The fact that in such cases the law 
takes over the role of ethical norms (sic!), would not raise much “controversy” if it was not 
for the continental model of law in Poland and the fact of perhaps not a complete, but partial 
(as far as it is possible) avoidance of being entangled in axiological discourse that does not 
provide satisfactory results. As it was already pointed out, in the literature, axiological issues, 
which nonetheless gain in importance and whose role in influencing law is not denied – are 
still treated as an element outside the legal system and outside the framework of the legal 
norm. 
In this light, the discourse on the collision of legal and ethical norms does not only 
become less attractive, but it loses its “real existence”. It becomes apparent. It turns out that 
contradictory  decisions  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  are  not  mutually  contradictory  – 
trivially: they are consistent with the axiology of the one who takes the decision. The judges 
of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  do  not  rule  in  isolation  from  axiology;  they  make  the 
aforementioned  juridization  of  values.  In  addition,  it  has  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  does  not  have  the  possibility  to  shirk  taking  the  decision  –  it  is 
obliged to make it, irrespective of substantive difficulties of the case in question. In the civil 
law legal system, referring to the argument of incommensurability of values, or referring 
directly to axiology in the justification, would simply be unacceptable, because it would raise 
doubts as to the neutrality and impartiality of the judge. Thus, it would be contrary to the 
requirements of this system. It is therefore crucial to get rid of the superstition under which 
one cannot rationally discuss values or argue in their favour.  
In fact, the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal have repeatedly found themselves in an 
insurmountably  difficult  situation  because  they  decide  on  the  basis  of  the  axiology  –  
recognized by them – whose justification is far from being unambiguous. Furthermore, it is 
impossible  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  their  decision  relates  to  society  and  the 
environment in which they rule (in order to undertake the latter, extensive sociological and 
psychological  research  would  be  indispensable).  Faced  with  such  difficulties  and  the 
simultaneous need to issue a ruling, it appears that when “ignoring” axiological issues, the 
Constitutional Tribunal enjoys the protection afforded to it by legal positivism, which allows 
it to use the safe buffer manifested in the phrase “action pursuant to the law”. 
The result of consistent avoidance of axiological dilemmas in the justification of rulings, 
although  in  fact  they  are  indeed  settled,  is  an  apparent  contradiction  in  the  consistent 7 
judicature. What needs to be explained at this point is the issue of what I mean by the concept 
of a consistent judicature. Judges cannot be expected that their judgments will be consistent 
with each other in the sense of almost identical convergence in almost identical cases, and that 
their line of reasoning remains static. What should be expected at most is an idiosyncratic 
similarity. However, it should not come as a surprise that the decisions issued in similar cases 
may  differ.  The  same  values  can  be  in  fact  interpreted  differently  and  their  place  in  the 
preference scale of the one who takes the decision is not immutable. From the standpoint of 
this article, such rulings which once give priority to the legal norms, whereas at different 
times – to ethical norms, shall not be contrary because they will always be related to the 
comparison,  the process of weighing and association of values. As I nevertheless emphasize 
below, the very mode of balancing values requires adopting some philosophical conception. 
The issue that needs to be separately presented, which is crucial for further consideration, 
is the question on the nature of the ethical norms incorporated into the law. One can adopt one 
of two assumptions, which imply different consequences for the problem at issue. If it is 
assumed that the ethical norms automatically become legal norms (they are transformed from 
ethical to legal norms) by means of being granted statutory legitimization to enter into the 
composition of the legal system, then the dispute over the precedence/priority of legal norms 
over ethical ones, and vice versa, does not exist. In such case, in fact, the decision would be 
taken between two legal norms. 
It seems that this first standpoint is not entirely obvious. Although the Constitutional 
Tribunal accepts that the scope of cognition over the ethical norms results from the statutory 
delegation,  which  allows  to  introduce  ethical  norms  to  the  legal  system,  yet  such 
incorporation may not deprive the latter of the nature of ethical norms. Thus, in the discussed 
approach,  ethical  norms  incorporated  into  the  legal  system  still  preserve  their  ethical 
character, which means that the legal norms are indeed the basis for their establishment, but 
only  in  a  formal  sense,  rather  than  in  respect  to  the  content.  Ethical  norms  contained  in 
professional ethics codes, are in fact the manifestation of values commonly accepted by a 
given corporation, while they do not necessarily have to extensionally overlap with the legal 
norms,  though  of  course  their  compliance  is  postulated  due  to  purely  practical  reasons 
(increasing obedience to the law, positive attitudes vis-à-vis the law). When adopting the 
second standpoint, the question that the conflict of ethical norms with legal ones comes down 
to the conflict between the values protected by these norms, is still justified. 
 
IV. The conflict of decisions - or only an apparent dilemma? 8 
Let us now analyse these problems on the example of two judgments of the Constitutional 
Tribunal at the interface of ethics and law, discussed when examining the compatibility of the 
Code of Medical Ethics with the Constitution, with the reservation that it leaves aside the 
question of the content of a given dispute.  
 
  The  Constitutional  Tribunal  – 
ruling as of 1993 U. 1/92 and W. 
16/92 
The  Constitutional  Tribunal  – 
ruling as of 2008 SK 16/07 
Ontological  status 
of  ethical  norms  – 
when  entering  the 
legal  system,  do 
they  become  legal 
norms  or  do  they 
remain  ethical 
norms? 
The  norms  contained  in  the 
Code of Medical  Ethics remain 
ethical norms – even when they 
enter the legal system; 
The ethical norm can exist in law 
only  due  to  the  legal  norm;  the 
existence  of  the  former  is 
conditioned  by  the  existence  of 
the latter; “ethics does not concern 
law directly”;  
The relation  in  the 
extension  of  the 
systems  of  ethical 
and legal norms 
“Ethical norms are separate from 
legal norms” 
“The ethical and legal norms are 
separate;  they  constitute 
autonomous systems” 
The  extent  of  the 
dependence  of  the 
Code  of  Medical 
Ethics  on  the 
content of the legal 
norm? 
“Deontological  norms  do  not 
have  per  se  legal  nature.  They 
indeed belong to a set of ethical 
norms independent from the law 
(...)  Nonetheless,  the  sets  of 
legal  and  ethical  norms  do  not 
overlap and they consist of two 
relatively independent ranges” 
 
”The claim that the ethical norm 
must be consistent with the legal 
norm is unauthorised.  
Such  hypothesis  would  imply 
the priority of legal norms over 
the  ethical  norms.  In  fact  law 
should  rather  have  the  ethical 
legitimacy.  Ethics  does  not 
require legalistic legitimacy” 
“On account of the source and the 
basis,  its  independent  normative 
character is challenged” 
“they  (...)  belong  to  a  separate 
normative  order  and  they  obtain 
legal  quality  under  commonly 
valid  law,  precisely  due  to  the 
statute  (...)  and  to  the  extent 
specified by its provisions (...) the 
subject of the control is the legal 
norm inferred from the provisions 
and regulations (of law – HD) “ 
“what  remains  outside  the  scope 
of  substantive  control  is  the 
fragment  (...)  issued  without 
express statutory basis (...), it  has 
influenced the decision to dismiss 
the proceedings in this regard” 
Accordingly,  the  norms  of  the 
Code  of  Medical  Ethics  exist  in 
law only on the basis of explicit 
consent; 
On  entering  the  legal  order,  the 
norms  contained  in  the  Code  of 
Medical  Ethics  become  legal 
norms. 
The  extent  to 
which  the  content 
of  the  legal  norm 
“The  legal  norms  should  be 
supported  by  the  system  of 
values  accepted  by  the  society, 
The  Constitutional  Tribunal 
refuses to issue a decision to the 
extent in which the ethical norms 9 
depends  on  the 
Code  of  Medical 
Ethics?  
especially when it comes to the 
basic values” 
“By  means  of  an  act  of  law, 
ethical  norms  can  be 
incorporated  into  the  system  of 
valid law. An Act on Chambers 
of  Physicians  has  undertaken 
this  very  incorporation  of  the 
norms  of  the  Code  of  Medical 
Ethics. The norms of this Code 
have  specified  the  content  of 
legal norms contained in the Act 
on Chambers of Physicians”. 
have  no  direct  statutory 
delegation; 
The Constitutional Tribunal made 
the extent of the Code of Medical 
Ethics conditional on the extent to 
which  an  act  of  law  defines  the 
extent  of  the  Code  of  Medical 
Ethics,  where  the  norms  of  the 
Code  of  Medical  Ethics  have 
become legal norms; 
 
The  extent  of  the 
ethical  norms  of 
the  Code  of 
Medical  Ethics  in 
relation  to  the 
extent  of  legal 
norms 
It  is  anauthorised  to  claim  that 
the  ethical  norm  must  be 
consistent with the legal norm.” 
(...) “Since, naturally, one cannot 
implicitly  require  the 
compliance of the ethical norms 
with  the  Constitution  and 
statutes,  then  determining  such 
inconsistency  cannot  result  in 
the  duty  to  repeal  the  ethical 
norm.  What  is  more,  these 
norms  are  neither  adopted  nor 
repealed  as  provided  for  legal 
norms.”  
-  de  facto,  they  are  not  legal 
norms,  and  they  may  have  a 
wider  extent  than  the  legal 
norms 
The ethical norms of the Code of 
Medical Ethics must be consistent 
with the legal norms; 
Legal 
legitimization  of 
ethical norms 
“It  is  law  that  should  have 
ethical  legitimization.  Ethics 
does  not  require  legalistic 
legitimization.” 
Ethical norms must be consistent 
with  legal  norms  that  delegated 
them; 
 
The above table shows that the norms of the Code of Medical Ethics, in order to be tested for 
their compliance with the Constitution, must be issued under statutory authorisation. Yet, the 
latter  is  not  equivalent  to  the  fact  that  those  norms  become  legal  norms  after  being 
incorporated into the legal order. 
The  analysis  of  the  judgments:  W.16/92  and  U.1/92  shows  that  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal gives priority to the ethical norms of the Code of Medical Ethics, in the sense that it 
allows them to be created in a wider extent than it results from the underlying legal norms. On 
the other hand, in the event of a collision of these norms, it is the law that should be modified 
and adapted to ethics. 10 
The view that this interpretation is correct has been manifestly confirmed in a dissenting 
opinion expressed by C. Bakalarski, the judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, in relation to the 
judgment W.16/92:  
 
“Accordingly, by virtue of the statute, the provisions of ethics and deontology were granted the 
character  of  legal  norms  by  providing  the  sanction  of  the  state.  The  fact  that  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal is interested in these provisions follows not from the fact that these are merely moral norms – 
as adopted by the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment – but also because under the statute itself, 
these norms have become legal norms (...) (Chamber of Physicians – HD) could not and cannot be 
placed above the law, regardless of its objectives” (...) “As a result of the ruling (of the Constitutional 
Tribunal – HD), the Sejm may, if deemed appropriate, amend the relevant provisions of statutes rather 
than the provisions of the Code of Medical Ethics. It follows that the Sejm is to adjust statutory 
provisions to the provisions of the resolution of one of the professional corporations (sic!) (...). Such 
an assessment already encroaches the realm of judicial independence. It should be noted at the same 
time that these assessments do not provide any legal argument, and they are made on the single 
legitimate moral basis (...) it is in the interest of the citizens to preserve judicial independence and, 
consequently, to assure that (...) the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal were subject only to the 
Constitution (article 33a paragraph. 5 of the Constitution)”.
13 
 
In light of the second judgment, citation SK 16/07, the legal norms are given priority 
over the ethical ones. In my opinion, this claim is illegitimate. Such decision protects the 
values that have the priority in the preferential scale of decision-taking body. These values are 
the  values  of  the  legal  norm  rather  than  ethical  one.  Thus,  as  it  seemingly  appears,  the 
judgment  does  not  stand  for  choosing  a  positivist  paradigm.  Referring  to  the  formalist 
position makes it unnecessary to justify the undertaken axiological decision and allows to 
avoid the objection of arbitrariness.  
Another issue is the scope of the delegation that can be determined by the legal norms. 
Can the ethical norms established by the professional self-government exceed in their scope 
the boundaries of statutory delegation, while not going beyond the Constitution, or whether 
they should have the same limits as executive acts issued under the provisions of a higher 
level? We must consider whether the ethical norms introduced into law, may have different 
scope than the Constitution. One should undoubtedly reject the possibility that they could be 
contrary to the Constitution. It is worth considering whether such norms could further clarify 
the values that already exist in constitutional norms, or even introduce additional ones, worthy 
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of protection, since the feature of the Constitution should be, by its very nature, a proper 
degree of generality. We must therefore consider whether adopting such a position would not 
undermine the social order, in the situation when the professional corporations created the 
codes of ethics containing a broader catalogue of values than the constitutionally protected 
one. 
 
V. Are the apparent dilemmas dangerous?  
In conclusion, is it really necessary to define the status of the ethical norms incorporated into 
law? If the ethical norm becomes the legal norm, then the activities of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, as I believe, focus on the analyses within the same normative– legal system and its 
underlying  values  (axiological  dispute  between  the  values  contained  in  comparable  legal 
norms). When it is deemed that these are ethical norms that are indeed a part of the legal 
system, yet which retain the status of ethical norms, then the activities of the Constitutional 
Tribunal rely on the assessment of values: the one contained in the legal norm and ethical 
norm. In this case, the problem also boils down to an axiological dispute between the values 
contained  in  the  legal  norm  and  ethical  one.  This  means  that  the  activities  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal consist in the analysis whether there is an axiological antagonism in 
the legal order and, if so, in issuing the ruling that aims at removing the said antagonism. 
Given that the values rather than norms constitute the subject of research, it is less important 
to resolve the character of ethical norms incorporated into the law. 
The effect of the failure to adopt such a position is a situation in which the recipient of 
the judgment can be convinced of the absence of a uniform judicature, or even of a “rebirth” 
of positivism (the latest ruling gives priority to legal norms). Yet, these are not all of the 
consequences of this apparent dilemma. Another one is the inability to determine the basis 
(justification)  of  the  decision,  and  hence  the  unpredictability  of  the  judicial  verdict.  In 
practice, the professional associations will be confused of what authority they have as regards 
the creation of deontological norms in the codes of ethics. In fact, it will not be clear whether 
they are a kind of “executive regulations”, issued on the basis of statutory delegation, or 
whether  they  constitute  their  natural  complement,  not  necessarily  manifested  in  the  legal 
norms. It should be kept in mind though that decisions on creating the professional ethics are 
not detached from the judicature of the Constitutional Tribunal which also shapes in this area 
broadly understood policy of law. 
A  dangerous  paradox  can  be  also  encountered  in  situations  in  which  ethical  norms 
negatively affect the system of constitutional values and the law must take over the role of 12 
ethical norms. It seems that this was the case in the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 
2008. In the latter decision, the Tribunal did not grant priority to legal norms in order to 
protect the positivist paradigm. It held only that the value which is protected by the legal 
norm is consistent with the constitutional value and it is more crucial than the one protected 
by the ethical value, therefore, it should “defend” the constitutional order. 
The above analysis allows to conclude that the Constitutional Tribunal is afraid to admit 
that it is impossible to rule only by means of the legal norms, and, thus, that the law does not 
provide  sufficient  guidance  to  issue  a  ruling.  As  emphasized  above,  admitting  that  it 
undertakes the assessment of values, would face it with the objections on the arbitrariness of 
the decisions and I would like to avoid it at all costs.  
One might try to avoid the doubts that can be encountered in this aspect or even resolve 
them by adopting a two-aspect model of the legal norm that corresponds to the postulate of 
juridization of values. In this model, the term legal norm is not exhausted in terms of its 
horizontal perspective (the latter is understood by me as referring to a three-part or a two-part 
conception of the legal norm). It is essential to understand the legal norm also in vertical 
perspective,  which  consists  of  two  elements  –  commanding  element,  and  evaluative 
(axiological) one. Thus, the overall reconstruction of the term of the legal norm requires to 
take into consideration and to interconnect its two abovementioned aspects which, while not 
equivalent to each other, are functionally linked. The horizontal structure determines who 
should behave, in what way and under what circumstances (often in the event of a failure to 
comply with  the norm, there are consequences  in  the form  of sanctions), but  it does  not 
provide any answer to the question concerning the conditions/ reasons for such a command. 
They may be interpreted only when referring to the evaluative component of the legal norm 
contained in the vertical aspect of this norm. The value is therefore contained in the legal 
norm, even though for the sake of law making practice, it is not explicitly expressed in it.
14 
Since the element of the l egal norm is the value, the Constitutional Tribunal  – when 
using such a model – could undertake juridization of values on the basis and within the limits 
of the law. It would thus help to avoid the objection that the Tribunal does not act only on the 
basis  of  the  Constitution.  Accepting  that  any  legal  norm  (including  constitutional  norm) 
contains in its structure a value, would mean that the Constitutional Tribunal has the right to 
compare  the  values  and  to  undertake  axiological  argumentation.  The  objection  on  the 
arbitrariness  of  decisions  would  then  be  refuted  by  means  of  the  argument  of  broadly 
understood “fairness” of the decision, based on transparency and predictability, rather than on 
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feigned  axiology  obscured  by  invented  positivist  constructions.  The  activity  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal – understood as above – allows to regard as a plausible the view 
according  to  which  its  decisions  at  the  interface  of  law  and  ethics  are  only  seemingly 
contradictory, because the compliance with the Constitution does not result from the character 
of the norm to be examined, but from the assessment of the value that this norm contains. 
Accordingly, the dilemma whether the ethical norm, when entering the legal order, becomes 
the  legal  norm  or  whether  it  remains  the  ethical  norm,  and  therefore  what  is  the  mutual 
hierarchical relation between them, is illusory. 
I am aware of the difficulties resulting from taking such standpoint. The recognition that 
in its activity, the Constitutional Tribunal resolves axiological issues, solves neither practical 
nor theoretical problems, but it puts even higher demands since it transfers the considerations 
in the area which is not formalised, far from the precision and orderliness, but mostly, still 
unsatisfactorily analysed from scientific perspective, what must arouse the resistance of a 
lawyer, especially the one that is trained in thinking by positivist categories. 
I would also like to add that although the problem at issue was presented in the context of 
law application, the attempt to deal with it requires the development of a new philosophical – 
(theoretical) – legal conception which would “support” the practice. 
I do hope that this article will become a contribution to the discussion on the future of 
this branch of law. Is it ready to take a possibly heroic effort – which might prove to be 
fruitless  for  a  long  time  –  to  develop  a  conception,  the  element  of  which  would  be  the 
discourse on values in the legal system? This will entail engaging in a difficult philosophical 
axiological discourse.
15 The current state of knowledge does not allow to decide what would 
be more useful for the law  - secure fiction or uncertain, but honest revolution. It seems that 
the expectation to undertake new challenges, in particular by the philosophy of law , is most 
legitimized, even if the efforts are not crowned with success for a long time. If this issue is not 
undertaken, the Constitutional Tribunal, being left to its own actions, will continue to recourse 
to safe fiction, to reconcile what is with what ought to be. 
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